The disclosure of the Spectre speculative-execution attacks in January 2018 has left a severe vulnerability that systems are still struggling with how to patch. The solutions that currently exist tend to have incomplete coverage, perform badly, or have highly undesirable edge cases that cause application domains to break.
Introduction
Speculative side-channel attacks, such as Spectre [26] and Meltdown [30] have caused significant concern. While side channels, where secret data is leaked through unintended media to an attacker, have been well known and exploited previously [12, 16, 32] , the wide applicability of the newer speculative attacks [26, 30, 39] even to programs that are otherwise correct, the difficulty of fixing these side channels in software, and the high bitrates achievable through these speculative side channels, have resulted in a particular pressing need for good hardware solutions to remove the problem.
The community is still grappling with how to deal with balancing the desire for performance, achieved through outof-order execution and the relaxed microarchitectural guarantees it requires, against security properties only enforceable through in-order execution. Current software fixes [1, 36, 40] either limit performance significantly, have limited coverage, or require security knowledge by the programmer. Existing solutions in hardware include restricting instructions that depend on speculative loads [8, 42, 44] , which can perform well for many compute-bound workloads but causes other workloads to suffer significant degradation. Other techniques [43] replay all memory accesses at commit time, reducing instruction throughput.
We argue that permitting the microarchitecture to continue speculating broadly on loads, which is necessary for the high performance of modern processors, must be a factor in any solution to speculative-execution attacks. The approach we take is to add in limited hardware regions where speculative hardware state can be observed, which can be cleared when there is potential for access by an attacker. We design a speculative filter cache [21] , which disallows the propagation of speculative state into the rest of the system, including indirectly through the cache coherence protocol or prefetcher, preventing Spectre-like attacks between victim and attacker on a system. This prevents leakage of information outside a protection domain, yet can be reused by many different actors on the same system with mutual distrust of each other. Once a memory access becomes non-speculative its data can be placed safely in the main cache hierarchy. However, if the loads that accessed the data are squashed, then a cache line can remain securely in the filter cache until replaced via normal cache operation.
MuonTrap, our modest addition to a conventional outof-order superscalar CPU, removes the cache side-channels exploitable for speculative attacks, at low overheads (4% slowdown for SPEC CPU2006, and 5% speedup for Parsec).
Background
Speculative side-channel attacks are possible because of a number of features of modern systems working together to create a vulnerability. We consider these here before describing currently implemented attacks in detail.
Timing Side Channels
Side channels within a processor are a well-studied problem [11, 12, 15, 16, 27, 32, 34] . If execution on secret data can affect some indirectly visible property of the system, such as timing, then information about that data can be leaked without an attacker being able to directly access it. If we repeat this attack multiple times under different input scenarios, we may be able to leak the entire data item.
A particularly useful side channel is the memory system and its caches [26, 30, 31] . Both the existence and nonexistence of data in a cache can be used as a side channel: though the presence of cache data is not typically part of the programmer's model, by timing accesses we can observe information indirectly. For example, by priming a directmapped cache with known data items, then allowing another process to load an address based on secret data, we can infer which primed element was evicted, and thus a subset of the address loaded.
Requirements Shared cache between attacker and victim
Vector Attacker brings in data into the cache (1), followed by the victim being tricked into loading a secret value under speculation (2), followed by a second load based on the contents of the first, which will or won't evict the primed data (3) depending on the secret's value.
Attack 1: Spectre Prime and Probe Attack Speculative-execution channels are particularly problematic because they allow us to introduce our own timing side channels into code, or access data that the programming model states isn't accessible, and therefore indirectly leak it. This means that, even if the programmer ensures any regions of code designed to access such data cannot leak timing information, an attacker can introduce new code to do so.
Spectre
Spectre [26] uses speculative execution on an out-of-order processor to leak secret data from a victim process to an attacker process, or between protection domains within a process. It does this by tricking the victim into loading secret data speculatively, then using the result to do a second load with an address based on this secret. This will evict data primed by the attacker from the cache, or bring in data shared between the victim and attacker, previously evicted by the attacker, whose access can subsequently be timed to leak bits of information. An example of this is shown in attack 1.
There are two ways in which this attack can break down system barriers. One is between processes using inter-process communication: the attacker process can read the victim process's private data using such an attack. Within a process, in a low-level language such as C, user-space code can read any other user-space region, and so a Spectre attack to do the same is needless. However, if we have code in sandboxed regions, such as Javascript in a browser process, Spectre can allow the sandboxed code to implicitly read secret data outside of this region, unprotected by any kernel-level protection, and yet still considered harmful to leak into the sandbox.
Spectre is hard to protect against. Unlike Meltdown [30] , at no point is any particular security policy violated. Instead, a victim accesses data it is allowed to access in a way it didn't intend, and that is used to infer properties of such data.
Requirements and Threat Model
We assume a system with speculative execution, given its importance for performance. We therefore seek to remove side channels introduced by the speculation, by moving speculative state into structures that can be cleared when necessary.
Rather than preventing the use of any speculated or misspeculated state, much of which is both entirely innocuous and useful for performance, we instead consider it valuable to focus on a more precise threat model. We consider cache state Figure 1 : The architecture of MuonTrap. Filter caches are added for instructions, data and the TLB, which are cleared on a context switch, to isolate speculative data from being used for a speculative side-channel attack. Prefetch commit channels are added to preserve ordering of loads and stores without leaking speculative information, while still allowing larger caches to prefetch on data access.
affected by speculative execution to be vulnerable if either a) a separate process is able to read information from it, or b) in processes featuring untrusted code running in sandboxes (typically browsers), sandboxed code can observe speculatively accessed data from outside the sandboxed region but still within the process.
This means that a user can potentially see metadata from their own speculative execution, but other attackers cannot. An attacker is still, therefore, able to observe speculative execution by a victim if they can also trick the victim into timing a non-speculative access to the cache side channel the attacker has created before a context switch. We assume that an attacker only has arbitrary control over a victim's speculative execution, and so such attacks cannot be executed.
We only seek to remove speculative side channels from the memory system itself. In some microarchitectures other speculative side channels have been demonstrated, such as the clock when executing Intel AVX instructions [3] , but these attacks do not involve hiding state to be picked up later, and do not involve potential chains of speculative behavior, as is the case with cache loads, and so can be prevented by preventing soft state changes before speculation is completed.
We assume that protection within a sandbox, to prevent sandboxed code itself from speculatively reading other data, is achieved through other means, such as masked bounds checks on loads and stores [1] . This means we only have to focus on the more widely applicable and harder to prevent domain-crossing attacks such as between processes or through code within a sandbox calling code outside of the sandbox, avoiding slowdown for the vast majority of applications where sandboxed threat models do not apply, and avoiding unnecessary hardware overhead where possible.
Filter caches do not preclude the enforcement of stronger strategies that hide all information about the state of speculative execution that did not commit. But this simple policy is easy to enforce, does not require close coupling with the processor's internal state, covers the most interesting and widespread threats from Spectre-style attacks, and is permissive in terms of allowing optimizations where possible.
MuonTrap
We prevent speculative execution from leaving a trace that can be used for side-channel attacks by adding a small, 1-cycle access L0 cache between the core and the L1 cache, which is cleared on context switches, kernel entry, and sandbox entry. We force all speculative memory state to reside in the L0, meaning that other caches in the memory hierarchy contain only data that is non-speculative (i.e., it has been accessed by committed instructions only). We call the L0 cache a speculative filter cache and refer to other caches in the hierarchy as non-speculative caches.
With MuonTrap, speculative memory accesses propagate through the conventional cache system, but do not evict data from non-speculative caches and do not alter data within them. Data may be copied back to the L1 cache from L0 when a load or store using its cache line commits. Although speculative data may be evicted from the filter cache before this point, it must not be written into a non-speculative cache. To prevent data from escaping, filter caches are flushed on context switches, and between sandbox movement in processes with multiple actors in the same address space (such as JavaScript in the browser).
Adding this small cache increases lookup time in the L1 cache by one cycle, due to the need to consult the filter cache before the L1. However, its size means it can be faster than a conventional L1 cache in an out-of-order superscalar system, so for memory accesses with high temporal or spatial locality, we should expect that this system may, in some circumstances, improve performance via hits to the filter cache, as well as give the security properties we require.
In this section we first discuss the specification of and protection techniques employed in MuonTrap; the next section considers examples of specific Spectre-like side channels and how MuonTrap prevents their use. The overall architecture of our scheme is given in figure 1.
Filter Cache
We use the filter cache to isolate speculative data from the existing cache hierarchy, while still providing access to this data to other speculative instructions to improve performance. This means that higher levels of cache are not filled upon a miss (speculative or otherwise); instead this data is brought directly into the filter cache.
Ideally, the filter cache should be large enough to store the volume of speculative data that exists in common execution traces (i.e., for the maximum likely number of speculative loads and stores in the load and store queues). Otherwise, data will be evicted from the filter cache before it is committed, and won't reach the L1 cache, limiting the amount of temporal locality we can exploit, as the data must be reloaded on next use.
A speculative filter cache is non-inclusive non-exclusive with respect to the rest of the system's caches. To see why, consider attack 2: we must prevent data brought into a filter cache from influencing state anywhere else in the system, and so inclusion and exclusion must both be prohibited. This means that, as with an exclusive cache, data propagates up the non-speculative cache hierarchy in reverse. It is brought into the L0 filter cache, and when committed it is written back out to the non-speculative L1 (and higher caches in an inclusive hierarchy), becoming visible to the rest of the system. We assume that cache-line sizes are the same at all levels of the cache hierarchy, so data from the filter cache can be used to fill any other cache. If cache-line sizes differ, the filter cache Requirements Inclusion or exclusion with shared data between attacker and victim Vector Priming the L1 cache (1), followed by loading of secret data (2), and using that to evict data indirectly from the L1 by using inclusion (3) or exclusion with shared data Defense Non-exclusive, non-inclusive filter cache Attack 2: Inclusion-Policy Attack must take the size of the largest cache line in the system, and write through to this cache upon eviction of data.
The filter cache itself is faster than a moderately sized L1, provided the data is in the filter cache. This is because it is a small cache that can be virtually tagged and addressed from the CPU-side, and only ever contains data from one process, as it is flushed on context switches.
Cache-Line Commit
We add a committed bit to each filter-cache line, which is reset to zero when a cache line is brought in by a speculative instruction, or set to one when a cache line is brought in through a non-speculative instruction. This means that an uncommitted line (i.e., containing speculative data) will never be written back to the L1. When loads and stores reach in-order commit in the out-of-order pipeline, the cache is accessed and the committed bit for the cache line is set if it is zero, and the line written through to the L1 cache, regardless of whether the operation was a read or write. It is also left in the L0 to improve hit time. This write-through-at-commit policy increases the performance of cache flushes, since we know that all data in the filter cache can safely be thrown away at any point during execution. Data only propagates into non-speculative caches if an instruction using that data has reached commit in the out-of-order processor pipeline; that is, if the data would have been loaded in the absence of speculative execution.
When multiple speculative instructions are executed using the same cache line, if any of them commits then the relevant cache line should be written through to the L1 cache and the L0 line marked as committed. This is because a valid in-order execution would also have brought this data into the cache, and so the state should become observable to the rest of the system. Even if subsequent instructions using the same line do not commit, the cache lines that should be in the L1 do not change, and so an attacker cannot observe any further information from this.
Filter-Cache Clearing
A filter cache is cleared upon a context switch, system call or protection-domain switch, to prevent leakage of data via its presence or absence within the speculative filter cache between protection domains. As we need not write back any data upon a flush in this write-though filter cache, we can simply invalidate all data to make it invisible in the hierarchy.
We implement cache invalidation efficiently by storing a valid bit per cache line, in registers separate from the SRAM cache. On a context switch, rather than having to access every SRAM block, which may take as many cycles as there are cache lines, we can invalidate the entire cache by clearing every valid bit, which can be performed in parallel within a single cycle. On lookup, any cache line with the valid bit unset is ignored in the filter cache. This is unconventional for caches, which normally store validity implicitly using coherency state in SRAM, but is necessary for fast invalidation of the cache, and the extra state is feasible considering the small size of a filter cache. It is this fast invalidate that requires the filter cache to be write-through.
Note that we do not flush the filter cache on mispredicted branches. This is because many applications make use of data loaded in on mispredictions to improve performance, as such branches are likely to be taken in the future. Since this does not cause cache-timing leakages to other protection domains, we leave this data in the filter cache except from on context switches, system calls or other protection-domain switches, when all committed and uncommitted data is cleared.
Addressing
The filter cache is accessible in a single cycle, so it is desirable to avoid virtual-address translation on access. Clearing it on a context switch avoids aliasing between different physical addresses for shared virtual addresses across multiple processes. However, the filter cache must be checked by the cache-coherence logic, so it must be possible to index it by physical address. We therefore tag each entry with both the virtual and physical address of the data and index the cache by the shared least significant bits of both. This means it is virtually indexed from the CPU side and physically indexed from the memory side, to avoid translation. We also prevent virtual-address aliasing within a process by physically addressing upon a memory fill, which may overwrite an alias with a different virtual address but ensures that only one copy of each physical address exists at a time in the filter cache.
Coherency Mechanism
The filter cache stores data that may not be in any other cache level, and therefore must be checked by any mechanisms to preserve coherence. Without this, the filter cache could change program correctness by speculatively accessing data, even if the speculation is correct.
Keeping speculative data within privately accessible filter caches is not sufficient to prevent all speculative side channels within the cache system. If speculative behavior can cause coherency effects in non-speculative caches, or in filter caches of other cores currently within the domain of another thread, then information can be leaked via coherencyprotocol timings rather than cache evictions. We therefore need to prevent this speculative side channel, and achieve this via two mechanisms.
Requirements Shared data between the attacker and victim, with write access for the attacker, or ability for the victim to perform speculative prefetching in the exclusive state or issue speculative-write coherency requests [39] Vector Priming the cache (1) with a load, followed by tricking the victim into loading a secret (2) and using that to trigger a load (3) or store attempt to the same data [39] , increasing the time taken for the attacker to perform a store (4)
Defense Reduced coherency speculation Attack 3: Shared-Data Attack
Reduced Coherency Speculation The first is that we prevent filter caches from changing the coherence state of any non-speculative cache via speculative instructions. For example, in a MESI protocol, if a private cache on a different part of the hierarchy is in modified (M) or exclusive (E) states, then bringing this data into shared (S) state within the filter cache would change the other cache's state. An example of an attack sequence using this channel is given in attack 3.
To prevent such an attack, during speculative execution we delay any memory access that would cause another cache to move from M or E into S or I, until it is at the front of the instruction queue, and so will definitely be executed within the program. As these delays are purely based on the contents of non-speculative caches, they cannot leak speculative data.
Filter-Cache State Reduction
The second technique is to ensure that any speculative access from one filter cache has independent timing characteristics from any other, even after commit. We do this by only allowing data from a speculative access to be brought into the filter cache in shared state. This means that the presence of data in any other filter cache is not leaked by the coherence protocol, even after any relevant instructions commit and are sent into the non-speculative cache hierarchy, because with this constraint we only need to check non-speculative caches to move into the shared state. Indeed, as the filter cache is write-through, there is no direct need for any states other than shared and invalid (I) within a filter cache. Without this reduction of possible states, and associated timing guarantees, then attacks such as attack 4 would be possible, both before a speculative load is squashed, and given that filter caches are not flushed on a misspeculation, after correct execution is restarted.
This could effectively reduce behavior to MSI, even if MESI is internally supported, because if we assume all loads are speculative, no data will ever be brought in to E state. That said, states such as O and F in MOESI and MESIF will be used, as instructions entering those states would become non-speculative. Yet MESI, or more complex protocols, are typically supported in modern processors for performance reasons, and so we want to have data in exclusive state whenever useful. To achieve this efficiently, we add a new pseudo-
Requirements Filter cache with reduced coherency speculation, and shared data between the attacker and victim
Vector Speculative load access by the victim to secret data (1) used to trigger an access to shared data (2). This is followed by a load to an address the attacker knows will miss (3) causing a load to the same address accessed by the victim to be executed speculatively (4), and thus be delayed (5)
Defense Loading into the filter cache as shared, with asynchronous upgrade at commit (for performance)
Attack 4: Filter-Cache Coherency Attack state to the filter cache, SE, which behaves like S under coherence, but has a further critical property in that on commit, when the load becomes visible to the rest of the system, an asynchronous upgrade to the E state is launched from the L1 cache, similar to a prefetch. A line in the filter cache is placed in SE when an unprotected system would have placed it in E in the L1; that is, the data is in no other private nonspeculative cache in the system. The asynchronous upgrade this triggers at commit then invalidates any copies of the data in the rest of the hierarchy, if they have been written back since, and in any filter caches, which remain invisible from a timing point of view.
Wider Implications These constraints allow filter caches to participate in the cache-coherence protocol without any visible timing effects from speculative execution. This means that we need not repeat memory accesses, and can store the data brought in by a filter cache immediately into the nonspeculative cache hierarchy. As an effect, a commit of a load cannot be stalled by any second cache access, unlike in previous work [43] . The cost of allowing filter caches to participate in coherency is that upgrades to exclusive or modified must invalidate other filter caches in the rare event that the data isn't already in an exclusive state within a cache private to the upgrading core. Because filter caches are not allowed to affect other external structures, the existence of data within them cannot affect any directories in a system: we utilize timing-invariant invalidate operations, which broadcast to filter caches in this scenario. Still, writes to data not already in the private L1 are rare in most applications, which show significant spatial and temporal locality. With more complex cache hierarchies, broadcast operations need only go to cores with potential shared memory access to the data. For example, if data is in a shared L2 in modified or exclusive, invalidate broadcasts need not leave the cluster sharing that L2, as no microcache outside that cluster can contain the data in a valid state. In addition, as committed writes can typically be buffered, and shared data asynchronously Requirements Prefetcher with access to speculative load stream Vector Priming a cache featuring a prefetcher (1) by the attacker, followed by loading secret data (2) by the victim, who then loads an address to trigger the prefetcher to bring the next line into a non-speculative cache (3)
Defense Prefetch on commit Attack 5: Prefetcher Attack updated to exclusive in cases where no copies were found in non-speculative caches, this is typically preferable to no coherency on filter caches, as it reduces commit complexity for most instructions.
MuonTrap does not directly interact with the memory consistency model. All it is allowed to do in this respect is delay load operations, but this neither makes any particular ordering stricter nor weaker, and so any commonly-used consistency model can directly use MuonTrap.
Prefetching
It is insufficient to hide speculative memory accesses in filter caches if those accesses can indirectly trigger changes in non-speculative cache state from prefetches based on them. To see why, consider attack 5. By bringing in further lines based on the speculative access, a prefetcher would leak information to the wider hierarchy. We must therefore trigger prefetches only based on the committed instruction stream, rather than speculative accesses. Still, providing a stream of every memory access to a prefetcher may be superfluous. For example, accesses in the L1 would not trigger prefetches at the L2 in an unprotected system, and should not do the same in a filter-cache-protected environment. We therefore add a tag to each cache line in the filter cache, specifying which level of the non-speculative hierarchy it was brought in from. When a filter-cache line changes state from uncommitted to committed, a prefetch notification is then sent to the corresponding level, provided it has a prefetcher.
Protected Caches
Though this section has so far assumed that the filter cache is used to protect data-cache loads, this is not the only place in which a filter cache is needed in a system to prevent speculative side-channel attacks.
Instruction Cache Though the instruction cache was not used as an attack vector for the original Spectre attack [26] , it is possible to leak speculative information in a similar manner to attacking the data cache. For example, in attack 6
Requirements Instruction cache shared by attacker and victim Vector Priming the instruction cache (1) by the attacker, followed by loading of secret data (2) and using it to index into the instruction cache using an indirect branch (3)
Defense Filter cache for instruction access Attack 6: Instruction-Cache Attack an attacker can cause a victim process to jump to a memory location based on the value of secret data, and then infer this information by timing instruction access. We can fix this side channel in the same way that we fix the data side channel: by using a speculative filter cache for instructions in addition to that for data. This is comparatively simpler because there is no cache coherency for read-only data, and so we only need to set the committed bit on committing an instruction, without issuing any further memory transactions to upgrade the cache line.
TLBs and Page-Table Walkers
Side channels within a TLB are more difficult to exploit cross-process than on other caches, as no shared TLB translations will exist. Therefore attackers are restricted to prime and probe attacks, where they infer data by causing the victim process to evict translations placed in the TLB by the attacker. Still, for full protection we need to prevent eviction of non-speculative entries with speculative translations, by storing speculative translations in a filter TLB. On instruction commit, the relevant translations are moved to a nonspeculative TLB, and the filter TLB is flushed on a context switch, as with a filter cache.
Hardware page-table walks triggered from speculative instructions can write into caches. We must also prevent side channels occurring through this mechanism. Although we can enforce that these memory accesses go through a filter cache, working out when a page-table-walker cache entry should be committed is complex, as there is no one-to-one correspondence between executed instructions and page-table entries. Upon commit, we retranslate any instructions that caused page-table misses: these entries are likely to be in the filter cache at this point, and can be written back to the L1 as a result of the non-speculative retranslation. This allows us to mark filter-cache elements that should be written through into the L1, because they were part of valid nonspeculative execution.
Multicore and SMT
Different cores may have different processes running within them at any one time, and so each must have a filter cache to isolate them from each other's speculative side channels. Assuming that they are allowed to be from separate processes, this is also true of multiple threads in a simultaneous multithreading arrangement on the same core. Protection of the filter cache relies on isolating speculative data within the filter cache from threads from other processes. This necessitates that when multiple processes are run concurrently via simultaneous multithreading on the same core, they must not be able to infer filter-cache state about the other, otherwise information may leak between the two. This means each thread must similarly have either separate filter caches, or use partition-based isolation based on the process ID.
Within-Process Attacks
MuonTrap prevents between-process attacks by clearing the filter cache on a context switch, and user-kernel attacks by clearing on syscalls, thus preventing the attacker from learning any information based on what has or hasn't been loaded. However, an attacker may be in the same process as the victim, executing within a sandbox (if not inside a sandbox, the attacker already has nonspeculative access to the victim's data). We therefore need to clear filter caches on movement into sandboxed regions. This is performed using a dedicated flush instruction sat behind a non-speculation barrier [6] . As a result, speculation barriers only need to be inserted at the boundaries of sandboxes, rather than throughout the entire program as is currently necessary. This defense requires that an attacker can only cause execution outside of the sandbox by a path terminated with a filter-cache clear. For full protection against the subset of variant 2 attacks where the victim is fooled into mistraining its own branch targets by an attacker sandbox, branch-target-buffer isolation, as is already implemented on recent commodity systems [7] , is also necessary. For protection against Spectre 1.1 [23] within a sandbox, where speculative stores are used to overwrite return stacks and thus execute code outside the sandbox, stores within sandbox-interpreted code should be covered by masked bounds checks [1], and to prevent the sandboxed code itself from executing Spectre v1 attacks, masked bounds checks should also be used on sandbox-interpreted loads. By utilizing these simple software fixes where applicable, we can avoid the overheads of hardware mitigation for the vast majority of applications that are not vulnerable to such attacks, while covering those which are hardest to fix by using dedicated hardware.
Summary
To prevent speculative data from being leaked within the memory system, we have added MuonTrap, an extra layer of indirection, into the cache hierarchy. This filter cache sits between each core and the L1 caches to store speculative data and is cleared on switches of protection domain.
A basic filter cache in front of the L1 data cache, while able to defend against traditional Spectre attacks, can still allow information leakage through the cache hierarchy. We must therefore impose further constraints on the cache coherence protocol, add filter caches to the TLB system and instruction cache, and prevent data leakage via the prefetcher, for our system to be secure against other similar attacks.
Experimental Setup
To evaluate the performance impact of using a filter cache to prevent speculative side channels, we model a high performance multicore system using the gem5 simulator [10] in full system mode running Linux with the ARMv8 64-bit instruction set and configuration given in table 1, similar microarchitecturally to systems used in previous Spectre mitigation techniques [43, 44] . The L1 data cache is 2-cycle access, and the L1 instruction cache 1-cycle: this is because the instruction cache is typically faster in a modern system [17] , as it can be virtually tagged without aliasing issues. We simulate SPEC CPU2006 [18] in syscall emulation mode, fast forwarding for 1 billion instructions, then running for 1 billion instructions. We also evaluate on the Parsec [9] , running on the simsmall datasets with 4 threads in full-system mode running Linux. The benchmarks included are the subset that compile correctly for AArch64, and are run to completion.
Results for the open-source InvisiSpec [43] are reproduced on the same Aarch64 system, using the latest patches on GitHub [4]. The STT results [44] are those reported from the original paper (since source code is not currently available); missing values are those which were not originally recorded.
Evaluation
We first look at overall performance for the whole MuonTrap technique on SPEC CPU2006 (4% average slowdown) and Parsec (5% average speedup), before comparing with related work re-evaluated on the same system [43] and reported in the literature [44] . Then, we perform a tuning analysis on Parsec, focusing on the effects of cache size and associativity for a basic filter cache just protecting the data hierarchy for 4-thread Parsec [9] , as necessary for a traditional Spectre [26] attack. We finally examine in detail the overheads resulting from protections for the instruction cache, coherency protocol and prefetcher.
Performance
In figure 2 we see that execution is slowed down by 4% on average for SPEC CPU2006 [18] with MuonTrap. Some workloads (povray, lbm) are sped up by virtue of the faster L0 data-cache access relative to an unprotected system. Others are hampered by the small filter-cache size (bwaves), low associativity of the filter cache (cactusADM), the delayed commit-time prefetch mechanism (leslie3d and libquantum), the instruction filter cache (omnetpp) or a combination of all of these factors (zeusmp). The access delay for the L1 cache from being behind the filter cache also adds some overhead; geomean slowdown can be reduced further to 2% if access is allowed in parallel, as we shall later see in figure 8 . Still, for many workloads, the performance impact of all of these protections is negligible. Lbm is in fact sped up significantly using a filter cache. This is because of the inorder prefetching necessary for protection against speculativeexecution attacks, which, despite being more secure, also allows the prefetcher to better pick up the access pattern in this workload, dramatically improving performance. For Parsec on 4 cores (figure 3), despite its protections a filter cache actually results in a speedup for each workload (geomean 5%). This is because these parallel workloads are very amenable to having a small, 1-cycle L0 data cache in front of a conventional, slower, physically addressed 2-cycle L1, and the additional costs that clearing on context switches, on prefetches, on coherence, on evicting uncommitted data and on instruction fetch are not enough to outweigh this advantage. This is not the case for SPEC CPU2006, hence why systems that do not need the security of MuonTrap do not gain this performance benefit elsewhere.
Versus InvisiSpec
InvisiSpec [43] is a load-store-queue extension designed for the same purpose as the filter cache in this paper, in that it hides speculative execution. However, we see in figure 2 that MuonTrap typically has higher performance than either of InvisiSpec's two designs, despite the fact that MuonTrap also covers the instruction cache and prefetcher. The first of these (InvisiSpec-Spectre) assumes that data can be made visible as soon as its speculative load is not dependent on any unresolved branches, introducing a slowdown of 9.7%. The second (InvisiSpec-Future) incurs a 18.5% slowdown when it assumes that data is not safe to become visible until a load can no longer be squashed. MuonTrap assumes a stronger threat model than either InvisiSpec technique: an instruction is considered speculative until it commits, as this reduces hardware implementation complexity. This is close to the threat model of Invisispec-Future, and we often see performance spikes on similar workloads (bwaves, gamess, leslie3d, zeusmp); the cases where MuonTrap particularly suffers (cactusADM and leslie3d) are caused by the prefetcher, which is not protected by InvisiSpec. However, MuonTrap still achieves lower performance impact than Invisispec-Spectre overall. Further, on Parsec (figure 3), the up to 2× performance disadvantage of both InvisiSpec-Spectre and InvisisSpec-Future is entirely eliminated.
There are two main reasons for this. The first is that InvisiSpec accesses do not participate in the cache coherence protocol at all, and so all loads must be replayed and potentially reload their data when the instruction commits, causing a delay at the end of the pipeline. Our approach instead keeps filter-cache data coherent, but prevents data leakage by delaying execution of instructions that would invalidate other caches with the same data, which is an uncommon case. This allows other accesses to proceed speculatively while remaining coherent and hidden from other parts of the system. As this implies that a speculative instruction cannot gain exclusive access to a cache line, a speculative filter cache must issue a second coherence request in circumstances where this is desirable, much like the second request in InvisiSpec. However, because a speculative filter cache is coherent, this does not delay commit, prevents load instructions from ever having to be re-executed, and does not require the cache line itself to be reloaded from the cache hierarchy. This second cache-system access is asynchronous in a speculative filter cache, unlike in InvisiSpec, improving performance significantly. This coherency does mean that exclusive upgrades for stores must invalidate filter caches. However, we see in figure 6 that this is typically a rare occurrence, as most stores are to data already in private caches. This trades off an expensive common-case operation (repeat memory accesses before a load can commit) for a rarer one (filter-cache broadcasts for a subset of stores).
The second reason for our performance is that InvisiSpec stores cache lines in word-sized load-store log entries, whereas a MuonTrap speculative filter cache is a true cache, with cache-line-sized entries. This means our technique does not need to store multiple copies of data when there is temporal or spatial locality, reducing the amount of SRAM needed for the same coverage. Likewise, the filter cache can also service requests for already-committed data within a protection domain, giving 1-cycle access to that data. Given the L1 data cache is likely to be slower, this offers the chance for improved performance relative to an unprotected system without a small, fast cache. This second difference deliberately allows side channels within a protection domain, as later loads can forward to earlier ones, potentially affecting timing, and old uncommitted instructions are left in the filter cache to provide performance improvement for mispredicted but later-useful accesses. Further, as the filter cache is indexed by address, rather than allocated at instruction issue, later instructions can contend for resources with earlier ones, or evict committed data that would otherwise have been accessible, affecting timing. Still, as the filter cache is flushed upon security-domain changes, such as context switches, system calls and sandbox entry and exit, these side channels are eliminated when they can transmit data to other actors.
Versus STT
Speculative Taint Tracking [44] , similar to NDA [42] , Conditional Speculation [29] and SpecShield [8] , is based on the policy of restricting the forwarding of speculative load values. For many compute-bound workloads in SPEC CPU2006 (figure 2), this adds little overhead. In addition, SPEC workloads that are memory-bound, but feature little memory-level parallelism, such as mcf, also lose little performance. However, those with more complex memory-access patterns, such as omnetpp, suffer high performance losses that MuonTrap can alleviate. Indeed, on Parsec (figure 3) we see high geomean overheads of 25% for STT-Spectre, and 30% on the less permissive STT-Future, compared with a 5% speedup for MuonTrap.
Tuning Parameters
We now look at how tuning the parameters of a filter cache within just the data hierarchy affects performance, using the Parsec benchmark suite running with 4 threads. Figure 4 shows normalized execution time for Parsec from adding a fully associative filter cache to the system at various sizes, normalized to the same system without any filter cache or associated protections. We see that, for some benchmarks, even a single cache line (64 bytes) is enough to get close to the performance of an unprotected system. This is because these workloads feature either high spatial and temporal locality, or little memory-level parallelism, and therefore early eviction of cache lines from the filter cache before they can be committed from execution is rare. For other workloads, however, particularly streamcluster and freqmine, enormous slowdowns are observed when the filter cache is too small. However, these large slow- downs disappear for all benchmarks with four cache lines (256 bytes) of space in the cache or more. This is only a quarter of the number of loads from independent cache lines the processor we simulate can support (16 load elements), and yet it is sufficient to the point of producing a minor speedup. In cases where loads come from many different cache lines at once, there is little spatial or temporal locality available, and thus not writing back the data to the L1 does not affect performance. We find that the majority of performance improvement can be attained with a 2,048 byte filter cache, giving no slowdown for any benchmark and a speedup of 6.9% on average. For all other experiments, we assume a filter cache of this fixed size, which comes at negligible area overhead compared with the core itself.
Cache size
Associativity In figure 5 , we reduce the full associativity (32-way) of the 2,048 byte filter cache in figure 4 to show the performance impact. Even a direct-mapped filter cache gives a slight improvement. However, some workloads (blackscholes, canneal, fluidanimate, and streamcluster) are affected by conflict misses on filter-cache data before it can be committed, and written back to the L1 cache. We therefore set the associativity to 4-way to trade off access complexity compared to full associativity without reducing performance.
Cost Breakdown
A filter cache on the core's data side on its own would be sufficient to protect against the original Spectre attack [26] . However, to protect against similar attacks on other parts of the memory system, MuonTrap adds in a variety of further mechanisms to cover coherency, instructions and prefetching. We now consider to what extent each of these contributes to MuonTrap's overheads. Each of these is already included in figure 2 and figure 3 , but here we split them out for the most relevant workloads in each case to show the cost of each, looking at the most affected benchmark suite in each case. We finally show the further performance of a more intensive scheme that accesses the data filter cache and L1 in parallel, providing the potential to eliminate overheads further at the expense of complexity, which can reduce SPEC CPU2006 overhead from 4% to 2%.
Graphs for these additions are given in figure 7 for Parsec, and figure 8 for SPEC CPU2006. The following sections add mitigations successively, comparing against the previous one in turn.
Coherence Protection The removal of speculative coherence state changes, described in section 4.5 (coherency in figure 7) typically have negigible impact on the single-threaded SPEC workloads, and only a minor impact on the multithreaded Parsec workloads. This is because speculative coherency state changes to other caches are relatively rare, and under normal operation a bus transaction takes long enough that delaying it to make it nonspeculative does not alter performance significantly. In addition, the upgrades to exclusive from shared when a load commits do not increase contention or increase pipeline execution time significantly, since coherence requests are already rare, and since they do not block commit as they can be done asynchronously. The two exceptions to this are ferret and streamcluster, and even there the speed of the filter cache outweighs the additional slowdown for limited coherency speculation.
Still, this ignores the further overhead that any filter cache places on the memory system, which is necessary for correctness but is caused by the coherence protocol: the need for writes that aren't already in a core's private caches to trigger invalidates within filter caches. We have previously seen in figure 6 that this is significant for some workloads (bwaves, gcc, lbm, libquantum, mcr and zeusmp), and while we cannot uniquely isolate this overhead from the other filter cache overheads, we see that several of these workloads do suffer some performance overhead as a result (figure 8).
Instruction Filter Cache Unlike with the data cache, adding an instruction filter cache (ifcache in figure 7 ) rarely improves performance. This is because the baseline instruction cache already has a 1-cycle access latency, and so adding a filter cache has no improvement potential, except for preventing some conflict misses, due to being more associative than the L1. Indeed, slight performance drops occur with several benchmarks due to more lines being accessed before instruction commit than the instruction filter cache can store. On Parsec (figure 7) this is typically minor, save for fluidanimate, but even then the additional overhead is not enough to cause MuonTrap to lower performance overall. However, for SPEC CPU2006 (figure 8), we see multiple workloads taking a minor hit, and namd and sjeng taking a more significant penalty in performance.
Commit-Time Prefetching Altering prefetching to be performed at commit time (section 4.6, prefetching in figure 7 ) instead of immediately after a load has been issued, is a double-edged sword. While Parsec is minimally affected, in figure 8 for SPEC CPU2006 we see that while lbm and bwaves see significant performance improvement, through c a n n e a l f e r r e t fl u id a n im a t e f r e q m in e s t r e a m c lu s t e r s w a p t io n s g e o m e a n Normalized Exec Time fcache only coherency ifcache prefetching Figure 7 : Normalized execution time from cumulatively adding protection mechanisms to the system on Parsec, compared with an unprotected system without filter caches.
better tracking of the load stream without misspeculation, cactusADM and leslie3d suffer from reduced timeliness of their prefetches.
Parallel L1 and L0 access While Parsec has high performance regardless of filter-cache configuration, the 4% slowdown for SPEC CPU2006 leaves room for improvement. Even without additional protections, a filter cache alone is a significant detriment to many workloads simply because the filter cache cannot be sized large enough to cover any significant proportion of the working set, meaning that the additional delay to the L1 cache lowers performance. To mitigate this, at the expense of complexity, high-performance systems can be configured to access the 2-cycle L1 nonspeculative cache and 1-cycle L0 filter cache simultaneously. We see in figure 8 that this can reduce overhead from the 4% reported in the rest of the paper, down to 2%.
Summary
MuonTrap fact achieves a 4% slowdown on SPEC CPU2006 (worst case 47%), and a 5% performance improvement on Parsec, compared to an insecure baseline. Since MuonTrap typically avoids limiting speculation within a threat domain, it generally sees overheads lower than existing techniques in the literature [43, 44] . While mechanisms such as inorder prefetching do have a significant performance impact, slowdowns are still typically small, and can be mitigated further by accessing filter caches and non-speculative caches in parallel.
7 Related Work
Speculative Side-Channel Attacks
This paper concerns itself with eliminating speculative sidechannel attacks that leak data between protection domains.
Examples of these include Meltdown [30] , which defeats kernel protections on some out-of-order superscalar processors due to a speculative side channel caused by not checking permissions on cache fill, and Spectre [26] , which allows the leakage of secret information from a victim process by attacking the branch predictor or poisoning the branch target buffer. While these two are the most notorious attacks, other variants have also been proposed and implemented, including SpectrePrime [39] , which uses the cache-coherence system as a side channel for the same exploit. In addition, Spectre variants 1.1 and 1.2 [24] , which exploit the branch predictor as the attack mechanism but use speculative stores to shape that execution further, and variant 4 [2], which exploits speculative execution to leak data that should have been zeroed in program order, have been demonstrated. As these use cache side channels to leak the data, our protection mechanism prevents their utilization.
Current Mitigations
Deployed Mitigations A variety of software mitigations exist for protecting against some variants of Meltdown and Spectre. For the former, kernel page-table isolation [36] can be used to separate out kernel and user-space memory into separate address spaces, at overheads of up to 30% [36] . Spectre mitigations are also available in software, but as it is more difficult to protect against, mitigations tend to be more ad hoc: typically, program recompilation is required, and coverage is often low. Google's Retpoline [40] replaces vulnerable branches with unconditional jumps, to override the branch-target buffer's predictor to prevent speculation. This defends against variant 2 of Spectre on x86, but is ineffective for Arm systems [1]. For variant 1, on Arm systems non-speculative load barriers [6] can be inserted by the programmer to prevent particularly vulnerable loads from being exploited, however, this requires security knowledge by the programmer, reduces performance, and suffers from a lack of general coverage. LFENCE instructions can be used on x86 architectures [19] to similar effect, with similar downsides. Microcode updates such as Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) [19] also target variant 2 on Intel machines, by reducing speculation on kernel entry for indirect branches, but these cover only a subset of variant 2 exploits.
New Intel [28] and Arm [7] hardware designs feature variant 2 mitigations by isolating the branch-target buffer, preventing direct training by an attacker, but as variant 1 typically occurs by causing the victim to train itself, this strategy is of no benefit for the latter.
Memory Hierarchy InvisiSpec [43] , as discussed in section 6.2, covers speculative execution by associating loadstore-queue entries with cache lines, and repeating accesses to bring them into the cache when the instruction becomes nonspeculative. SafeSpec [20] also stores speculative data in fully-associative shadow structures attached to the loadstore queue. It requires strict limits on the forwarding of data to be secure, which also means that it must be significantly overprovisioned, and that the same data must be able to exist multiple times in the same SafeSpec shadow structure to prevent side channels. The paper does not consider coherence-protocol attacks, and its structure likely prevents application of the coherence strategy applied to MuonTrap, since the invalidation operation is infeasibly expensive on the large, fully-associative structures necessary for SafeSpec to work. DAWG [22] uses dynamic partitioning to isolate cache entries in the absence of shared memory to prevent general cache side channels, but this is not feasible for cross-process Spectre attacks, where a large number different processes may be executing concurrently with mutual distrust.
CleanupSpec [35] allows speculative state to propagate through the memory system, using rollback techniques to undo changes to the caches. While this prevents the direct channel from reading the caches once this rollback is complete, the rollback mechanism is itself timing-dependent on secrets brought in by an attacker, unlike MuonTrap's constant-time invalidation of its filter caches. Likewise, as CleanupSpec does not clear speculative state between protection domains, an attacker with code running concurrently with the victim's execution, but before it in program order, can observe state altered by the victim's execution.
Load-Propagation
Restriction SpecShield [8] , NDA [42] , Conditional Speculation [29] and Speculative Taint Tracking [44] are approaches that restrict various proportions of instructions dependent on speculative loads. While this can prevent the installation of secrets within a wide variety of side-channel mechanisms, and for workloads such as SPEC CPU2006 can be achieved with minimal slowdown [8, 44] , workloads with more complex memory behavior such as Parsec [44] and SPEC CPU2017 [42] suffer from the fundamental limitations of load restriction regardless of how permissive. Taram et al. [38] present context-sensitive fencing, where memory fences are dynamically inserted into the code stream by the microcode engine, to protect against speculative attacks on the kernel.
Side-Channel Attacks and Prevention
Side channels exist more generally [12, 16, 32] than the speculative attacks we focus on. In particular, common cryptographic-algorithm implementations [27, 33] can be vulnerable to leaking information about their input and secret keys if not designed to be timing independent on their input data. Related to side channels are covert-channel attacks [11, 34] , where two cooperating processes, one at higher security clearance than the other, modulate a shared resource to violate a mandatory access-control policy, to leak information.
It is possible to prevent all side-channel attacks in hardware [13, 31, 41] . However, this involves modification of the entire cache hierarchy. To prevent speculative side-channel attacks, it is possible to modify only the level closest to the CPU, and still achieve strong security properties.
Filter caches
Caches at the L0 level in a system have been utilized previously for power and performance [21] . Duong et al. [14] use small caches to reduce hit energy and conflict misses in embedded systems. Tang et al. [37] use small instruction caches to reduce power consumption. In terms of industrial implementation, Qualcomm Krait processors [25] feature small, direct-mapped, single-cycle L0 caches. Similarly, many Arm processors use small microTLBs close to the core to achieve high performance even with physically-mapped L1 caches [5].
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that it is possible to mitigate speculative side-channel exploits between domains at low overheads in hardware, without removing speculation, by adding speculative filter caches to store vulnerable state. In fact, MuonTrap can improve performance compared to an unmodified system: for the Parsec benchmark suite, we actually improve performance by 5%, while SPEC CPU2006 is reduced in performance by only 4%. The modifications we have described to conventional systems to protect against Spectre [26] , and many similar attacks we have identified, are simple enough to add to conventional systems, to both improve coverage and performance, and reduce manual effort, compared to current software and hardware mitigations.
